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Abstract
We develop a frictionless matching model under transferable utility where individuals
are characterized by a continuous trait and a binary attribute. The model incorporates
attributes for which there are heterogeneous preferences in the population regarding their
desirability, that is, the impact of the traits cannot be summarized by a one-dimensional
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status, further specify the model by observing that there are more male than female
smokers above each education level, and derive additional predictions about equilibrium
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that matching processes in the marriage market are
multidimensional. Spouses tend to be similar in a variety of characteristics, including age, body
mass index, education, race, religion, and smoking status (Becker, 1991; Ore¢ ce and Quintana-
Domeque, 2010; Qian, 1998; Silventoinen et al., 2003, Sutton, 1980; Weiss and Willis, 1997).
New developments in the matching literature have started to address the multidimensional
nature of attractiveness by considering settings with two or more attributes. In particular,
several recent studies1 consider frameworks where multiple characteristics can be summarized
by a single, one-dimensional attractiveness index, so that, technically, the matching process
is de facto one-dimensional. Such a single-index approach is a powerful tool, and it allows to
apply the standard one-dimensional matching techniques to settings with multiple attributes.
However, its validity relies on a strong homogeneity assumption: it must be the case that the
trade-o¤s between individual female traits are identically perceived by all men (and similarly
for male characteristics). This approach, appealing as it may seem, is not always appropriate.
When preferences for any of the relevant matching characteristics are heterogeneous within
either the male or the female populations (or both), matching becomes multidimensional, as
long as the traits at stake are not perfectly correlated. That is, the corresponding traits
cannot be collapsed into a single index, and one-dimensional matching techniques are not
well-suited to characterize the corresponding stable matches. In the marriage market, several
characteristics can be heterogeneously assessed by potential mates, including race, ethnicity,
age, health attributes, or smoking status. For instance, we know that smokers are more likely
to marry smokers (Clark and Etilé, 2006; Maralani, 2009; Sutton, 1980; Venters et al., 1984),
and that a large medical and public health literature essentially shows that non-smokers mind
their partners smoking status, while smokers do not.2
The goal of this paper is to extend the standard matching model under Transferable Utility
to a particular case of multidimensional matching, where one of the characteristics is assessed
heterogeneously by potential mates. In particular, we present a general resolution strategy
1See for instance Coles and Francesconi (2013) for a search Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) approach,
Chiappori, Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque (2012) for a general investigation.
2There is ample medical evidence that second-hand smoking has detrimental health e¤ects on non-smokers
but not on smokers (ASH, 2011; CDC, 2006; Glymour et al., 2008; Mannino et al., 1997). In addition, the
attitude of smokers towards smokers is much more permissive than that of non-smokers (ASH, 2011; Lader,
2009; Pilkington et al., 2006).
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and characterize the stable matching when individuals di¤er in two characteristics.3 We also
suggest a new way of testing matching models. In most one-dimensional matching models,
theoretical implications regarding who marries whom are straightforward; essentially, they boil
down to supermodularity implying assortative matching. In multidimensional contexts, how-
ever, things are much more complex, since theory may imply specic properties on matching
patterns along the various dimensions under consideration. We argue that such predictions
may be taken to the data and tested in reduced form. Specically, in this paper we study a
parsimonious model and derive a series of predictions. We then test hypotheses based on these
predictions, and nd they are indeed supported by the data. While our hypotheses tests can be
formally derived from several specic stochastic structures found in the literature, we argue
that they do not require explicit assumptions on the stochastic structure of unobservables;
therefore, and in the same spirit as previous tests of index-based models (e.g., Chiappori,
Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque, 2012), such tests can be viewed as a useful complement to
more structural approaches.
In our model, individuals are characterized by two dimensions. One characteristic is con-
tinuous, and can be interpreted as an index of socioeconomic status (from now on SES),
reecting di¤erences in education, income, social prestige, and others, or any combination of
those. The other characteristic is discrete, and more precisely dichotomic. We suggest to
interpret the second characteristic as the individuals smoking status. The marital surplus
function is assumed to be di¤erentiable and supermodular in the continuous indices, as is
common in the literature, and to be multiplicatively impacted by the discrete characteristic:
it may be diminished by the presence of a smoker in the couple. As long as smoking and
socioeconomic status are not perfectly correlated (and they are not), this heterogeneity in
preferences is a key feature of our setting: it rules out a single-index representation, since
the trade-o¤ between the two characteristics is perceived di¤erently among potential spouses,
which is precisely what index models forbid.
We rst analyze, as a benchmark, a fully symmetric version of the model, in which male
and female characteristics play the same role in the surplus function and are identically dis-
3Among multidimensional empirical works, Lindenlaub (2014) considers a specic model in which the dis-
tribution of types is normal and the payo¤ is quadratic to study multidimensional sorting between workers and
jobs in the labor market, while Galichon and Salanié (2010) and Dupuy and Galichon (2014) use a Choo and
Siow (2006) framework. For the analysis of dating patterns using a Gale-Shapley NTU approach, see Banerjee
et al. (2013) and Hitsch, Hortaçsu and Ariely (2010).
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tributed. We show that the resulting stable matching exhibits full segregation, in the sense
that smokers exclusively marry smokers. This result is interesting per se, since it does not
depend on the magnitude of the negative impact of smoking. In our purefrictionless frame-
work, therefore, even minor di¤erences in preferences (or surplus) may result in large-scale
segregation; moreover, the latter is e¢ cient, in the sense that it does maximize total welfare.
We then consider the general asymmetric case. We prove existence and generic uniqueness
of the stable matching and present a general resolution strategy, which can be used in any
discrete or continuous multidimensional framework. Even in our simple framework, a closed-
form characterization of the stable matching cannot be obtained in the general case; however,
we derive general predictions on the form that the stable matching may take. The analysis of a
specic, quadratic case in which a closed form solution exists is provided in our Supplementary
Material.
Next, we further specify the model by assuming that, for any SES level, there are more
male smokers than female smokers among individuals above that SES level, a pattern that
we actually observe in the data. This generates a set of additional predictions regarding the
nature of the stable matching. First, there are no mixedcouples in which she smokes and he
does not, whereas the opposite pattern he smokes and she does nothappens with positive
probability. Second, smoking husbands married to smokers are of higher quality(i.e., higher
SES) than those married to non-smokers: smoking premiumfor smoking wives. Third, and
conversely, non-smoking wives married to smoking husbands have a lower SES than those
married to non-smokers: smoking penalty for smoking husbands. Fourth, there is positive
assortative matching on SES among couples with identical smoking habits. Fifth, positive
assortative matching on SES by smoking status is stronger at the top of the SES distribution:
smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES distribution are more likely to marry smoking
wives (husbands) than those with lower SES. Similarly, non-smoking husbands (wives) at the
top of the SES distribution are more likely to marry non-smoking wives (husbands) than those
with lower SES. Finally, some female non-smokers may marry either a smoker or a non-smoker
with positive probability; then it must be the case that the smoking husband has a higher
SES. Similarly, some male smokers may marry either a smoker or a non-smoker; but then both
women have the same SES.
We use the Current Population Survey March Supplements data combined with the To-
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bacco Use Supplements (TUS) for the period 1996 to 2003. These TUS supplements, which
are widely used in medical research on smoking, provide the largest representative sample of
the US population, and, crucially, allow us to retrieve information on both spouses.
We follow a reduced-form approach to test the hypotheses based on the theoretical pre-
dictions on the stable matching derived from our deterministic model, acknowledging that
our general model could not be solved under a general stochastic structure. Our approach
is compatible with a Choo-Siow specication, that is, a framework where unobserved het-
erogeneity can be fully captured by an additive random term, which is moreover the sum of
two random variables with type 1 extreme value distributions; but it could also be used in
alternative settings.4 In our deterministic model, stability conditions imply that there should
be no mixedcouples in which she smokes and he does not, whereas the opposite pattern he
smokes and she does notshould happen with positive probability (the asymmetry between
genders being due to the larger prevalence of male smoking). In a more complex setting,
the presence of either search frictions (à la Shimer and Smith, 2000) or unobserved match-
ing characteristics (or both) typically results in positive probabilities for all possible couples.
Still, a natural hypothesis is that mixed couples where the wife smokes should be much less
frequent than vice-versa; i.e., the ratio of the two subpopulation sizes should be signicantly
lower than what would be implied by the sole di¤erence in relative smoking prevalence.5 To
test this hypothesis, we compare the actual subpopulations ratio to what it should be under
independence for each of the 9 US Geographical Census divisions; interestingly, we nd that
the hypothesis is satised in each of them, despite signicantly di¤erent smoking prevalences
across regions. This is consistent with our rst prediction.
Similarly, our regression analysis shows that among smoking husbands, those who marry
smoking wives exhibit (on average) 0.15 more years of completed education (or about a 1.2
percent higher annual earnings) than those with non-smoking wives, consistent with our sec-
ond prediction. Conversely, our evidence reveals that among non-smoking wives, those with
smoking husbands exhibit (on average) 0.11 to 0.13 fewer years of completed education than
those with non-smoking husbands, supporting our third prediction. Consistent with our fourth
4Taking the model to the data in a structural way is far beyond the scope of this paper. Extending the
Choo and Siow (2006) methodology to a multidimensional setting with discrete and continuous characteristics
is still an open question, despite recent and promising advances (Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss, 2014; Dupuy
and Galichon, 2014; Galichon and Salanié, 2010).
5 In a pure Choo-Siow setting, this hypothesis would follow from a result by Graham (2011).
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prediction, we also nd positive assortative matching on education for each type of couple,
and in particular for couples with identical smoking habits. In addition, at the top of the SES
distribution, positive assortative matching on education by smoking status is stronger, sup-
porting our fth prediction. Finally, the well-known negative correlation between education
and smoking is conrmed in our data, and we estimate that for men this correlation becomes
less negative if one further controls for the wifes education, while this pattern does not appear
for women; we argue that this fact is in line with our last prediction.
Perhaps the most informative prediction of our bidimensional matching model is the one
stating that smoking husbands married to smokers have higher SES than those married to
non-smokers. Such a prediction is typical of a matching logic, in which female smokers even-
tually benet from being on the short side of the market. A potential concern here is that
such empirical patterns (even when controlling for additional covariates), instead of being
a consequence of matching mechanisms on the marriage market, may reect the fact that
smoking behavior is endogenous to marital status. However, we doubt this can explain our
ndings. Using information on engaged couples, newlyweds, and couples married for over 5
years, Sutton (1993) nds that similarities in smoking status were already present about the
time of marriage. More recently, Banks, Kelly and Smith (2013), who use retrospective evi-
dence from the Health and Retirement Study, show that most smoking behavior is initiated
before marriage, so that smoking is predetermined with respect to marital status. In addition,
we use a simple and popular estimator in program evaluation (see Wooldridge, 2002) obtained
from an OLS regression of education on spousal smoking status controlling for the predicted
probability that the spouse is a smoker (and its square). The key variable(s) used in predict-
ing such a probability is (are) the age at which the spouse started smoking regularly (and
its square). Reassuringly, the estimates adjusted by the spousal propensity to smoke give a
similar picture to our main estimates.
Finally, we present two refutability tests in our Supplementary Material: one based on
randomly sorting married men and women to couples, which shows that the predictions of our
model are rejected; another based on testing a single-index model in education and smoking,
which is rejected by the data.
The next Section contains the model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 tests the
hypotheses based on the theoretical predictions of our model. Section 5 presents a brief
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discussion, while Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We present a parsimonious preference model given the two types of characteristics at stake,
dening the surplus structure and the corresponding stable matches under Transferable Utility
(from now on TU).6 After characterizing the equilibrium under a benchmark symmetric
case (where male and female characteristics play the same role in the surplus function and are
identically distributed), we analyze the general case deriving predictions on the form that the
stable matching may take, which can be used in any discrete or continuous multidimensional
framework, although a closed-form characterization of the stable matching cannot be obtained.
Finally, we introduce the male prevalence condition into the model (for any SES level, there
are more male smokers than female smokers among individuals above that SES level), and
derive several predictions that will be the basis of the hypotheses in our empirical analysis.
2.1 The basic framework
2.1.1 Populations
We consider two populations (men and women) of equal size, normalized to one. Agents di¤er
in two respects. First, they are characterized by a continuous index; one may, without loss of
generality, assume that this index is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1]. A possible
interpretation is in terms of socioeconomic status (SES); then the index depends on the agents
income, education, prestige, or any combination of those. Second, agents are also characterized
by some dichotomous indicator taking values in the set fN;Sg; in our empirical application, S
stands for smokerandN for non-smoker, although alternative interpretations are possible.
An agent is thus formally characterized by a pair (x;X) if female and (y; Y ) if male, where
6The theoretical analysis of matching under TU is typical in marriage market analysis, whereas models
analyzing dating typically consider NTU. Matching under TU dates back to Koopmans and Beckmann (1957),
Shapley and Shubik (1971), and Becker (1973). In particular, the last two contributions show that the stable
matching maximizes aggregate surplus, and that the associated individual surpluses solve the dual imputation
problem. In turn, the surplus maximization problem belongs to the class of optimal transportation problems,
which date back to Monge (1781) and Kantorovich (1942); see Villani (2003) and McCann and Guillen (2010)
for recent presentations. The precise connection between matching models and optimal transportation has been
analyzed by Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) in the discrete case, and by Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992),
Ekeland (2010) and Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010) in the continuous one.
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x or y 2 [0; 1] is the agents continuous index (i.e., SES), and X;Y 2 fN;Sg denes the
agents discrete characteristic (i.e., smoking status). Let F (resp. G) denote the cumulative
distribution of female (male) characteristics (x;X) ((y; Y )) over the set [0; 1]  fN;Sg, and
let FX (x) (GY (y)) denote the number of females (males) with smoking status X (Y , with
X;Y 2 fN;Sg) and SES no larger than x (y). In particular, FX (1) and GY (1) respectively
denote the total number of females and males with smoking habits X and Y .
2.1.2 Surplus
In any married couple, the sum of individual utilities is given by some function of the partners
characteristics; as it is customary, we dene the surplus generated by marriage as the di¤erence
between this function and the sum of utility levels that each spouse would reach as single. In
our framework, the surplus depends on both the discrete and the continuous characteristics of
each partner. We assume that the surplus  generated by a match between (x;X) and (y; Y )
has the form:
 ((x;X) ; (y; Y )) = S (x; y) if X = Y = N
 ((x;X) ; (y; Y )) = S (x; y) otherwise
The function S is strictly increasing, continuously di¤erentiable and supermodular; more-
over,  < 1. This means that the impact on marital surplus of the spousessmoking habits is
fully summarized by a single parameter , which represents the decrease in surplus due to the
presence of (at least) a smoker in the couple. Hence, in our framework, the surplus of a mixed
(smoker, non-smoker) couple is the same as that of a couple of smokers, but strictly less than
of a non-smoking pair.
Restrictive as it may seem, we believe that the common  assumption is a reasonable
approximation. The multiplicative nature of the impact of  reects the fact that smoking,
by reducing life expectancy, decreases the present discounted value of future welfare propor-
tionally. We believe that this is more realistic than an additive parameter, as the latter would
imply that those couples with lower socioeconomic resources (and surplus) would be dispro-
portionately penalized by having (at least) a smoker in the couple. In addition, a large medical
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and public health literature7 shows that a smoking partner decreases life expectancy of a non-
smoker but not of a smoker, which is compatible with our assumption.8 Last but not least,
while the single parameter  assumption cannot be directly tested (since the marital surplus
is not observed), one can evaluate its plausibility using auxiliary conditions of the Choo-Siow
type, such as unobserved heterogeneity of type 1 extreme value distribution form. We perform
this exercise and nd empirical support for it (see Table S1 in the Supplementary Material).
2.2 Stable matching
2.2.1 Denition
A matching is dened as a measure  on the set ([0; 1] fN;Sg)2 and four functions uN (x),
uS (x), vN (y) and vS (y). Intuitively, for two sets A;B  [0; 1]  fN;Sg,  [A;B] denotes
the probability that a woman belonging to A is married with a man belonging to B; and
for any female (x;X) (male (y; Y ), with X;Y 2 fN;Sg), uX (x) (vY (y)) is the utility she
(he) receives at a stable matching. A constraint on  is that its marginal should equal the
initial distributions of individuals; i.e., the marginal on the set of females (males) is F (G).
In addition, on the support of , individual utilities satisfy:
uX (x) + vY (y) =  ((x;X) ; (y; Y )) ;8 ((x;X) ; (y; Y )) 2 Supp () ;
reecting the fact that if two agents may marry with positive probability, their individual
utilities must add up to the surplus they generate when married.
A matching is stable if no matched agent would be better o¤ unmatched, and if no two
individuals would prefer being matched together to their current situation. Normalizing sin-
glesutility to zero, stability can be summarized by the following set of inequalities: for any
7See for instance ASH (2011), CDC (2006), Glymour et al. (2008), Mannino et al. (1997), amongst oth-
ers. Moreover, the attitude of smokers towards smokers is much more permissive than that of non-smokers
(ASH, 2011; Lader, 2009; Pilkington et al., 2006), suggesting that beyond the impact on life expectancy, the
psychological costs of a smoking partner are large for non-smokers but negligible for smokers.
8A natural extension would allow the surplus to be decreased by a smaller amount when both spouses smoke
than when only one is a non-smoker; i.e., the surplus would be discounted by  < 1 if both are smokers, and by
0 <  if only one is a smoker. We briey discuss the implications in the concluding section (see footnote 15).
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(x;X) ; (y; Y ) we have that
uX (x)  0; vY (y)  0 and (1)
uX (x) + vY (y)   ((x;X) ; (y; Y ))
therefore
uX (x) + vY (y)  S (x; y) if X = Y = N (2)
 S (x; y) otherwise
where an equality obtains on the support of . The rst constraints in (1) reect the require-
ment that married people should prefer marriage to singlehood; the second constraint in (1)
expresses that any two individuals cannot, by forming a new match, strictly increase their
current utilities.
2.2.2 Existence
Existence of a stable match stems from general results, which state that in a TU context, the
minimization of aggregate utility over the set of stable matches is equivalent to the maximiza-
tion of aggregate surplus over all possible assignments.9 Formally, if (; uN (x) ; uS (x) ; vN (y) ; vS (y))
is a stable matching, then the measure  solves
max
2M
Z
 ((x;X) ; (y; Y )) d ((x;X) ; (y; Y )) (3)
whereM denotes the set of measures on the set ([0; 1] fN;Sg)2 whose marginal distributions
coincide with the initial measures F and G on the female and male populations, respectively.
Since this set is compact and  is continuous in x and y, a solution exists. Conversely, for
any solution  to the surplus maximization problem, consider the dual program:
min
uN ;uS ;vN ;vS
Z
[0;1]fN;Sg
(1 [X = S]uS (x) + 1 [X = N ]uN (x)) dF (x;X)
+
Z
[0;1]fN;Sg
(1 [Y = S] vS (y) + 1 [Y = N ] vN (y)) dG (y; Y )
9See Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2010) for a complete presentation.
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under the constraints in (1). If (uN ; uS ; vN ; vS) denotes a solution, then (; uN ; uS ; vN ; vS)
denes a stable matching.
Let us note that there may exist matches involving mixed strategies, whereby an open
set of agents are each matched to several agents with positive probabilities. In our setting,
an individual may be indi¤erent between two types of mates. For instance, if a woman with
SES x0 is a non-smoker, the partial of the surplus with respect to x is @S (x0; y1) =@x if she
marries a non-smoker with SES y1, and @S (x0; y2) =@x if she is matched with a smoker with
SES y2. While S is strictly supermodular, we may still have that:
@S
@x
(x0; y1) = 
@S
@x
(x0; y2)
with y2 > y1 since  < 1.
2.3 The symmetric case
As a benchmark, we consider a setting that is totally symmetric between genders. This
implies that (i) male and female characteristics play the same role in the surplus function
(S (x; y) = S (y; x)) and (ii) the distributions of characteristics are identical for men and
women (F = G). Then, the stable matching can easily be characterized.
Proposition 1 Under the symmetry assumptions (i) and (ii) above, there exists a unique
stable matching, which is completely assortative. Smokers only marry smokers, and non-
smokers only marry non-smokers; moreover, in each couple, spouses have the same SES.
Proof. It is well known that a matching is stable if and only if the corresponding measure
maximizes total surplus. In this context, positive assortativeness within each smoking category
directly follows from supermodularity. We simply need to show that it cannot be the case that
an open set of non-smokers of one gender marry smokers. Assume it is; then an equal measure
open set of non-smokers of the opposite gender also marry smokers. But since  < 1, the total
surplus is then less than in the completely assortative matching, a contradiction.
While the symmetric case is obviously very specic, it constitutes an interesting bench-
mark. A rst lesson that can be drawn from it is that bidimensional matching of the type
under consideration naturally leads to segregated outcomes. In the symmetric context, even
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if the loss incurred when a non-smoker marries a smoker is very small (i.e.,  is very close
to one), the marriage patterns exhibit complete segregation, in the sense that smokers exclu-
sively marry smokers and non-smokers exclusively marry non-smokers. In other words, minor
di¤erences in preferences may have a spectacular impact on marital patterns, particularly in
terms of segregation. In addition, one can easily compute each spouses utility at a stable
matching (see Appendix).
The preceding conclusions, however, heavily rely on the very specic features of the sym-
metric framework. In particular, no trade-o¤ exists between the two characteristics at the
stable matching: there is no point, for a non-smoker, in considering a smoker as a spouse,
since a non-smoker with exactly the same SES is always available at equilibrium.
2.4 The general case
We now consider the general case. In what follows, let pN (x) be the probability that a non-
smoking woman with SES x marries a smoker (then 1  pN (x) is the probability she marries
a non-smoker). We dene similarly pS (x0) ; qN (y) and qS (y0) as the probability of marrying
a smoker for a female smoker, a male non-smoker and a male smoker, respectively. These
probabilities are endogenous, and are determined by the equilibrium (stability) conditions.
2.4.1 Qualitative results
In this subsection, we provide some qualitative properties of the equilibrium, which hold true
irrespective of the exact distribution of smokers and non-smokers in the population and the
exact form of the (supermodular) surplus. A rst result expresses the fact that, at a stable
matching, matching is positive assortative on SES among couples with identical smoking
habits:
Proposition 2 Consider two matched couples, (x;X) ; (y; Y ) and (x0; X) ; (y0; Y ) with iden-
tical smoking status. For almost all such couples, x  x0 if and only if y  y0.
Proof. Assume, for instance, that x  x0 but y < y0 on a subset of positive measure. The
surplus generated by any two such couples is
1 = ((x;X) ; (y; Y )) + 
  
x0; X

;
 
y0; Y

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while the matching (x;X) ; (y0; Y ) and (x0; X) ; (y; Y ) would generate a surplus
2 = 
 
(x;X) ;
 
y0; Y

+
  
x0; X

; (y; Y )

> 1
by strict supermodularity of  in (x; y). Should this situation exist for a non-null set of couples,
the matching would not maximize total surplus, a contradiction.
The second result states that among individuals with high SES, matching is assortative
on both SES and smoking status. Specically:
Proposition 3 Assume that the upper bound of the support of the measures FS, FN ; GS and
GN is 1. Then there exist thresholds xN ; xS ; yN and yS in [0; 1) such that for almost all
xN  x  1; xS  x0  1; yN  y  1 and yS  y0  1,
pN (x) = qN (y) = 0 and pS
 
x0

= qS
 
y0

= 1
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 3 states that non-smokers with high enough SES marry non-smokers with
probability 1: marrying a smoker would decrease the surplus by a factor , which for high
SES can only decrease total surplus. Similarly, smokers with high enough SES only marry
smokers.
However, the previous result is only true at the top of the SES distribution; further down,
randomization may appear at a stable matching. To see why, assume that the distributions of
the male and female populations are such that men are much more likely to smoke than women.
The assortative pattern described in Proposition 2, together with the measure restrictions,
imply that both non-smoking wives and smoking husbands, being on the long side of the
market, will have to marry down(i.e., a spouse with relatively lower SES). At some point,
the marginal non-smoking wife may become indi¤erent between marrying a non-smoker or
the marginal smoking husband, because the resulting loss in total surplus (due to  < 1) is
exactly o¤set by the higher SES of the latter.
Note that, in particular, male smokers who match with female non-smokers must have a
higher socioeconomic status than their wife; indeed, the only reason why a female non-smoker
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would agree to marry a smoker (thus accepting a shrinkage of total surplus) is the shortage
of male non-smokers. This particular pattern is not directly linked to the multiplicative
nature of the impact of smoking; as soon as marrying a smoker involves a loss in surplus, we
expect similar patterns. What is specic of the multiplicative setting, however, is that these
phenomena do not take place at the top of the distribution where the loss is larger.
This same logic also suggests, however, that in a given neighborhood, all forms of random-
ization are not simultaneously possible. In our example, for instance, while female non-smokers
may want to marry a smoking spouse, male non-smokers would not, since they would lose a
share  of the surplus and the opportunity to marry up. This feature is indeed general and
is expressed by the following result:
Proposition 4 Assume there exists an open set O such that, for all x 2 O, 0 < pN (x) < 1
so that x marries either a non-smoker y or a smoker y0 with positive probability. Assume
moreover that qS (y0) > 0 so that y0also marries a smoker x0 with positive probability. Then
qN (y) = 0 and pS (x0) = 1 almost surely. Moreover, x0 = x and y0 > y.
Similarly, if for all y in some open set O0; 0 < qN (y) < 1 so that y marries either a non-
smoker x or a smoker x0 with positive probabilityand pS (x0) > 0 so that x0 also marries a
smoker y0 with positive probability, then pN (x) = 0 and qS (y0) = 1 almost surely. Moreover,
x0 > x and y0 = y.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 4 states that the various types of randomizations are mutually exclusive. In the
neighborhood of some given SES, it may be the case that female non-smokers and male smokers
intermarry with positive probability; but then, in this same neighborhood, female smokers and
male non-smokers only marry their own type. Of course, the pattern may be opposite in a
di¤erent neighborhood;10 ultimately, the matching patterns depend on the distributions F
and G.
2.4.2 Surplus maximization
We now describe the mathematical form of the problem, and indicate a resolution strategy
that works for arbitrary distributions.
10Examples can readily be constructed by using disconnected subpopulations among both men and women.
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Start with the constraint that the marginals of the stable measure  must coincide with
the female and male population measures. Proposition 2 greatly simplies the expression of
these constraints. Indeed:
 Consider a non-smoker female with SES x, matched with a non-smoker male with SES
y = N (x). Then the number of non-smoker females with SES higher than x, married
with a non-smoker, must equal the number of non-smoker males with SES higher than
y, married with a non-smoker:
Z 1
x
(1  pN (t)) dFN (t) =
Z 1
N (x)
(1  qN (t)) dGN (t) (4)
which denes the function N .
 Similarly, for a non-smoker female with SES x marrying a smoker with SES y0 =  N (x):Z 1
x
pN (t) dFN (t) =
Z 1
 N (x)
(1  qS (t)) dGS (t) (5)
which denes  N .
 For the other combinations of smoking status:
Z 1
x
(1  pS (t)) dFS (t) =
Z 1
S(x)
qN (t) dGN (t) (6)
Z 1
x
pS (t) dFS (t) =
Z 1
 S(x)
qS (t) dGS (t) (7)
In particular, there exists a one-to-one relationship between the four probability functions
(pN ; pS ; qN ; qS) and the four matching functions (N ; S ;  N ;  S).
Clearly, the exact marital patterns characterizing the stable matching depend on the joint
distribution of SES and smoking status of the two populations. Here, we provide the general
tool that can be used to solve the problem with arbitrary distributions. The idea, again, is to
exploit the duality between stability and surplus maximization. With the previous notations,
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aggregate surplus is:
 =
Z 1
0
[(1  pN (t))S (t; N (t)) + pN (t)S (t;  N (t))] dFN (t) (8)
+ 
Z 1
0
[(1  pS (t))S (t; S (t)) + pS (t)S (t;  S (t))] dFS (t)
The rst integral considers the contribution of the female non-smoker population. An
individual with SES t may (with probability pN (t)) be matched with a smoker with SES
 N (t), in which case the couple generates a surplus S (t;  N (t)); alternatively, she may
(with probability 1   pN (t)) be matched with a non-smoker with SES N (t), generating a
surplus S (t; N (t)). Similarly, the second integral represents the contribution of the female
smoker population to total surplus.
A stable matching, dened by the functions pN ; pS ; qN ; qS and N ; S ;  N ;  S , linked by
(4) to (7), maximizes aggregate surplus under the constraints 0  pA (t)  1; 0  qA (t) 
1; 0  A (t)  1; 0   A (t)  1, where A = N;S. The stable matching can therefore be
derived as a solution to a maximization (optimal control) problem. Finally, once the functions
pN ; pS ; qN ; qS (or equivalently N ; S ;  N ;  S), which dene the stable matching, have been
computed, one can readily recover the intracouple allocation of the surplus (see Appendix).
2.5 The constrained general case
We now introduce the additional assumption that men smoke more than women, in the
following sense:
Assumption MP (Male Prevalence) For any SES level x,
FS (x)  GS (x)
In words, for any SES x, there are more male than female smokers with SES x or
larger. This may describe a situation in which men are more likely to smoke, but also one in
which men and women have similar smoking habits but the male SES distribution rst degree
dominates the female one, as well as many others. As we shall see in the empirical part, the
MP assumption is satised in the data. Under that assumption, it is possible to characterize
the stable matching as follows:
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Proposition 5 Assume that the upper bound of the support of the measures FS, FN ; GS and
GN is 1. Then there exist thresholds xN ; xS ; yN and yS in [0; 1) such that:
 for almost all xN  x  1; xS  x0  1; yN  y  1 and yS  y0  1,
pN (x) = qN (y) = 0 and pS
 
x0

= qS
 
y0

= 1
 for almost all x < xN ; x0 < xS ; y < yN and y0 < yS,
0  pN (x)  1; 0  qS
 
y0
  1; qN (y) = 0 and pS  x0 = 1
 for any x such that pN (x) > 0, let N (x) and  N (x) respectively denote the non-smoker
and smoker mate of (x;N). Then
 N (x) > N (x)
 for any y0 such that qS (y0) < 1, let S (y0) and  S (y0) respectively denote the non-smoker
and smoker mate of (y0; S). Then
S
 
y0

=  S
 
y0

Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 5 rst states that high SES people are exclusively matched to partners with
identical smoking habits a result already derived by Proposition 3. For lower SES, ran-
domization may happen, as Proposition 4 indicates, but only in one direction: non-smoking
women may marry smokers, but smoking women and non-smoking men always marry their
own. Lastly, when a female non-smoker may marry both a smoker and a non-smoker with
positive probability, the smoker has a higher SES than the non-smoker.
A remark coming directly from the optimal control formulation sheds some light on the
form of the randomization. The Hamiltonian corresponding to the program (8) is linear
in pN (x), the coe¢ cient being equal to S (x;  N (x))   S (x; N (x)), which is always non-
positive. For large values of x,  N (x) and N (x) are both close to 1, and since  < 1 the
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coe¢ cient is negative, implying pN (x) = 0. Randomization requires the coe¢ cient to be zero;
therefore, whenever randomization takes place, it must be the case that
S (x; N (x)) = S (x;  N (x))
(which, incidentally, implies  N (x) > N (x)). Since both N (x) and  N (x) depend on the
probability pN (x) (by 4 and 5), pN (x) must be such that this equality holds over the relevant
domain. In addition, the intracouple allocation of the surplus can be recovered (see Appendix).
Finally, we note that where exactly randomization occurs, and with which probability,
depends on additional assumptions on the exact form of the surplus function and the two
distributions. As an illustration, we provide an example in the Supplementary Material,
where (i) smoking status and SES are independent, (ii) men are more likely to be smokers
than women at all SES levels and (iii) the surplus S is quadratic and symmetric. In that case,
the program can be solved in closed form. There is a threshold below which non-smoking
women randomize their mates; moreover, the probability does not depend on the SES. More
complex patterns can be constructed by varying the distributions of characteristics.
2.5.1 Theoretical Predictions
In summary, the theoretical predictions of the constrained general case are:
1. There are no mixedcouples in which she smokes and he does not, whereas the opposite
pattern he smokes and she does nothappens with positive probability.
2. Smoking husbands married to smokers are of higher quality (i.e., higher SES) than
those married to non-smokers: smoking premiumfor smoking wives.
3. Non-smoking wives married to smoking husbands have a lower SES than those married
to non-smokers: smoking penaltyfor smoking husbands.
4. There is positive assortative matching on SES among couples with identical smoking
habits.
5. Positive assortative matching on SES by smoking status is stronger at the top of the
SES distribution: smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES distribution are more
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likely to marry smoking wives (husbands) than those with lower SES. Similarly, non-
smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES distribution are more likely to marry
non-smoking wives (husbands) than those with lower SES.
6. When a female non-smoker marries both a smoker and a non-smoker with positive prob-
ability, the smoking husband has a higher SES than the non-smoking one. When a male
smoker marries both a smoker and a non-smoker with positive probability, both women
have the same SES.
3 Data Description
3.1 CPS March and TUS data
Our empirical application uses years of education as the measure of SES and smoking status for
the binary attribute. We use data from the US Current Population Survey (CPS), specically
its annual March supplements and the Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS), for the years 1996 to
2003, which provide the largest samples of married couples for whom information on tobacco
use is available. The standard demographic and education variables are extracted from the
annual March CPS supplements, to which data on smoking status are merged from the TUS.
The TUS are monthly CPS supplements available discontinuously over time and in di¤erent
months. Specically, the available TUS of interest are January and May 1996, 1999, 2000;
June 2001; February 2002; and February and June 2003.
The CPS is a series of monthly cross sections, with a short longitudinal component. In-
dividuals in the sample are interviewed eight timesfour times, followed by a break of eight
months, and then interviewed for the same four months the following year. As such, it is
possible to match observations of the same individuals across months, using the household
and person identication codes, along with the month-in-sample information. However, sev-
eral observations are dropped due to the specic design of the rotation samples by 4-month
periods. In addition, we also check for age, gender and race, to ascertain that the merged
observations consistently belong to the same individual.11
The TUS-CPS is a National Cancer Institute sponsored survey of tobacco use and policy
11Madrian and Lefgren (1999) illustrate and explain the matching procedures to longitudinally merge the
CPS respondents.
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information that has been administered as part of the CPS since 1992. It is considered a key
and reliable source of national, state, and sub-state level data on smoking and other tobacco use
in US households, which are widely used in medical research on cancer and other consequences
of smoking (e.g., Delnevo and Bauer, 2009; Mills, Messer, Gilpin, Pierce, 2009). It provides
data on a nationally representative sample of about 240,000 civilian, non-institutionalized
individuals aged 15 years and older.
We are able to match individuals across months, merging the TUS supplements back to
the March supplement of the corresponding year, to build a series of repeated cross-sections
for the years 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. Due to the CPS rotation sample
design described above, the sample size of each match is at most 14 ,
1
2 , or 3/4, of the original
March sample size (when matched to June, January and May, or February, respectively). In
general, the farther from March the TUS supplement month is, the fewer observations can be
matched, with the strong restriction that the TUS months of September (1992, 1995, 1998),
and November (2001 and 2003) cannot be merged back to March, as they do not share any
respondent (Madrian and Lefgren, 1999). Nevertheless, our sample is large, with detailed
socioeconomic and smoking information on both spouses, and (to the best of our knowledge)
it is the rst time it is used to study marriage and smoking.
We specically extract husbands and wives from our merged CPS les. Married individual
records of the reference person and her spouse are then matched on the household identication
code (and household number) to create a single observation for each couple, keeping only
observations of couples who lived in households with only one family. Our main sample of
husbands and wives consists of white couples, where the wife is between 22 and 32 years old
and the husband is between 24 and 34 years old. This demographic group allows us to focus on
recently married couples. In the US the median age at rst marriage was around 27 for men
and 25 for women for the period 1996-2007. On the other hand, a lower bound of 22 and 24
years old also allows us to include college graduates after they have completed their schooling.
The additional two years in the husbandsbounds are based on the standard median / mean
age di¤erence of two years between male and female spouse (Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss,
2009). Note that the March CPS does not record the duration of marriage; in particular, the
June Fertility Supplements that used to provide the age at (rst) marriage, do not contain it
any longer in the most recent years that our study is concerned about.
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In addition to individual age, we use the state of residence, year of interview, sample
household weight and education of the individual. From 1992, the CPS records education
as degrees attained rather than years of schooling completed, we thus assign the number of
years of schooling to the corresponding degrees. We will also consider information on self-
reported health status, number of children under age six and male-head indicator. March
CPS household weights are used to make our sample of couples representative of the US
population.
From the Tobacco Use Supplement, we retrieve information on the smoking status of
each individual. Specically, we focus on the respondentsanswers to whether and how often
they smoke, whether they have smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime, and at which
age they started smoking regularly. From the rst two questions, we construct a dummy
variable of smoking status, dening a person as a smoker if she reports to smoke every day or
some days, and has smoked at least 100 cigarettes in her lifetime, and as non-smokers those
who say that they never smoke, or those who have smoked less than 100 cigarettes in their
lifetime (CDC denition, NCHS, 2010). Age at which they started smoking regularly, as a
predetermined explanatory variable of current smoking status with respect to marital status,
will prove useful in dealing with the potential endogeneity of smoking with respect to marital
status. Finally, note that each spouse directly reports his/her information, and self-reporting
of smoking status is considered a reliable source of information, as it is found to be validated
by measured serum cotinine levels (Caraballo et al., 2001).
3.2 Smoking Prevalence by Gender
An interesting aspect of the smoking attribute is the asymmetry in the smoking prevalence
across genders. In the US, and actually in many countries, male smokers largely outnumber
female smokers, a discrepancy that has remained stable over the last decades. This gender
asymmetry has been emphasized by the Surgeon General (e.g., Surgeon Generals Report,
2001), as well as by several studies in various elds (e.g., Gruber (2001) in economics and
Öberg et al. (2011) in medicine). While a negative smoking gradient is observed by education
(e.g., Gruber, 2001), the gender gap in smoking prevalence is maintained across all education
levels. For instance, in 2007, the prevalence of smokers by educational level among white men
and women 25 years of age and over were as follows: 30.8% vs. 23.9% for those with less than
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high-school; 29.9% vs. 25.2% for those with high-school; 21.8% vs. 19.6% for those with some
college; and 10.5% vs. 8.2% for those with college or above (NCHS, 2010).
We further investigate this gender smoking asymmetry by computing the number of smok-
ers by gender and educational attainment (years of education) in our data. Figure 1 shows
that the number of male smokers is always higher than the number of female smokers, for
each educational attainment (years of education). Hence, theMP assumption is satised in
our data.
[Figure 1 about here]
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the main variables of interest in our sample. Panel
A reveals that women are slightly more educated and slightly less likely to be in excellent or
very good health than their husbands, while their average number of children under six years
old is about 0.8. Panel B reports the same statistics for never married individuals, showing
again that men are healthier and less educated than women, and with a negligible number of
young children. Finally, note the asymmetry in the smoking prevalence across genders: the
smoking prevalence is 22% for husbands versus 17% for wives (29% and 26% for never-married
men and women).
[Table 1 about here]
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 From Theory to Data
It is well known by now that matching models are di¢ cult to test from the sole observation
of matching patterns. For instance, the Choo-Siow formulation, where the matching problem
is analyzed as a series of discrete choice models, is exactly identied and therefore cannot
be rejected by the data, even with its strong parametric assumption, i.e., that unobserved
heterogeneity follows a type 1 extreme value distribution. Here, we suggest that an alternative
approach may be feasible. In more complex settings, including multidimensional contexts,
matching theory can generate strong qualitative predictions. In some cases including the
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present onehypotheses based on these predictions can be tested in reduced form. Specically,
the theoretical analysis suggests that matching patterns should exhibit specic features due
to the underlying competitive structure. These features could in principle be formally derived
from an explicit, specic stochastic structure, which can be based on a Choo-Siow setting
(following a line of research initiated by Graham, 2011), but not in general; an alternative
justication would involve a rank orderproperty à la Fox (2010), or possibly search models.
In any case, we argue that if the MP assumption is satised, then we expect the following
regularities to hold:
Hypothesis 1: Relative Prevalence of Mixed Couples. Mixed couples in which the wife
smokes (denoted (0,1)) should be less frequent than those in which the husband smokes
(denoted (1,0)). Actually, the MP assumption by itself implies an asymmetry between
the proportions of mixed couples: if there are more male than female smokers, then one
expects more (1,0) couples. To take an easy benchmark, assume that the proportion of
smokers in the male (resp. female) population is equal to sM (resp. sW ) for all SES
levels; then if matching were random with respect to smoking habits, the ratio of (0,1)
to (1,0) couples should be
robserved < rrandom =
sW (1  sM )
sM (1  sW )
In our total sample, sM is :22 and sW is :17, so the ratio r implied by the sole di¤erence in
relative smoking prevalence is around :72; we expect the observed ratio to be signicantly
smaller than this threshold. Moreover, the same exercise can be performed for each
marriage market(or region).
Hypothesis 2: Smoking Premium for Smoking Wives. Among smoking husbands,
those who marry smoking wives should have (on average) a higher SES than those who
marry non-smokers.
Hypothesis 3: Smoking Penaltyfor Smoking Husbands. Among non-smoking wives,
those who marry smoking husbands should have (on average) a lower SES than those
who marry non-smokers.
Hypothesis 4: Assortativeness by SES among couples with identical smoking habits.
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Among couples with identical smoking habits (i.e., both smokers or both non-smokers),
matching should be assortative on SES.
Hypothesis 5: Stronger Assortativeness by Smoking Status at the Top of the SES
Distribution. Smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES distribution are more
likely to marry smoking wives (husbands) than those with lower SES. Similarly, non-
smoking husbands (wives) at the top of the SES distribution are more likely to marry
non-smoking wives (husbands) than those with lower SES.
Hypothesis 6: Conditional versus Unconditional Correlation between Smoking
and SES. When two non-smoking women with the same SES marry respectively a
smoker and a non-smoker, the non-smoker should be on average of lower SES than the
smoker. That is, controlling for the (non-smoking) wifes SES, the smoking habit of
the husband should be positively correlated with his SES. This result seems counter-
intuitive, since a well-established empirical fact is that the (unconditional) correlation
between smoking and education is negative: low SES is an important predictor of smok-
ing behavior (e.g., CDC, 2010). In the theoretical framework we use, however, (perfect)
assortative matching on SES implies that, for given smoking habits, the husbands SES
is fully determined by his wifes. In reality, agents match on several characteristics
(many of them unobservable), so that the wifes SES is not a perfect control for the
husbands, meaning that the (unconditional) negative correlation between smoking and
SES is likely to persist. We therefore restate the prediction as follows: the conditional
correlation between male SES and smoking status, given the SES of non-smoking wives,
should be less negative than the unconditional one. Note that this pattern should not
hold true for women.
The remaining part of the paper is devoted to testing these hypotheses.
4.2 Testing the Hypotheses
4.2.1 Relative Prevalence of Mixed Couples
Table 2 reports both the observed (Panel A) and random (Panel B) matching patterns by
smoking status for husbands and wives. Panel A reveals that there is strong assortative
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mating by smoking status: about 71% of couples have non-smoking spouses, and roughly 10%
consists of smokers. This is in line with previous evidence on marital sorting by smoking
status (e.g., Clark and Etilé, 2006). In addition, there are fewer mixed couples where the
wife smokes than vice-versa, 6.7% versus 11.93%. These gures are very di¤erent from the
percentages arising from random matching that are reported in Panel B, where sorting is
weaker (the percentage of couples in the main diagonal is now less than 70%) and the two
types of mixed couples are much more prevalent and similarly represented. Indeed, Panel C
shows that the ratio of observed mixed couples where the wife smokes than vice-versa is 0.56
(s.e.=0.03), which is statistically signicantly lower than the 0.72 (s.e.=0.02) implied by the
sole di¤erence in relative smoking prevalence, consistently with our hypothesis 1.12 As a last
test, in Panel D, we perform the same exercise at the US Geographical Census division level
(which consists of 9 regions). The results are quite explicit: we nd that the prediction is
satised in each of these regions. Under the null of random matching, the probability of such
an outcome would be extremely small, i.e., 2 9 = 2  10 3.
[Table 2 about here]
4.2.2 Smoking Premium and Smoking Penalty
We investigate hypotheses 2 and 3 in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. They contain a series of
regressions in which either the husbands or wifes education is the dependent variable while
spouses education and smoking status are the main explanatory variables, for the samples of
smoking husbands or smoking wives in Table 3, and of non-smoking husbands or non-smoking
wives in Table 4. Two specications are presented: a standard one, with controls for own age,
year and state xed e¤ects; and another one with additional controls, where we also include a
spousal very healthy indicator, number of children under age six and a male-head indicator.
[Table 3 about here]
Starting from the left-block of regressions, columns (1) and (2) show that among smoking
wives there is no statistically signicant di¤erence in the average years of completed education
between those who marry smoking men and those who marry non-smoking ones, and that
12Standard errors are computed using the delta method. The di¤erence in the ratios is statistically signicant
at the 1% (p-value=0.0000).
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the point estimates are virtually zero. The action is concentrated in columns (3) and (4):
among smoking husbands those who marry smoking women have on average 0.15 more years
of completed education (or about a 1.2 percent higher annual earnings13) than those with
non-smoking ones. This supports our hypothesis 2.
Our theoretical analysis shows that, given the shortage of smoking women, smoking men
who marry smoking women should be more educated, whereas no such e¤ect should be ob-
served for women, which is what we observe in the placebocolumns (1) and (2). Smoking
men have to compete for smoking partners with their own education. In other words, smoking
women marry upwith respect to her own education; they benetfrom the fact that they
are on the short side of the market by marrying a higher qualityspouse. Note that the sign
of the wifes smoker coe¢ cient in columns (3) and (4) is opposite to the well-known negative
gradient between own smoking and own education.
The evidence presented in Table 3 is also supportive of our assumptions on the surplus
reduction due to smoking. If, for instance, smokers also preferred non-smokers then we would
not observe the positive coe¢ cient of columns (3) and (4). By the same token, our empirical
evidence also shows that a gender asymmetric perception of smoking cannot be the driving
force behind the observed matching patterns. If men, regardless of their smoking status,
perceived smoking in a woman as a defect, we would not observe the positive coe¢ cient of
columns (3) and (4) either.
We now turn to investigate hypothesis 3. Table 4 inquires about the average education
among non-smoking wives and non-smoking husbands depending on the smoking status of
their spouses. Consistent with hypothesis 3, columns (1) and (2) show that among non-
smoking wives those with smoking husbands have on average 0.13 to 0.11 fewer years of
completed education (or about a 0.9 percent lower annual earnings) than those with non-
smoking husbands. In other words, a smoking husband marries, on average, a worse non-
smoking spouse in terms of education than if he were to be a non-smoker: smoking husbands,
who are on the long side of the market, marry down, that is, they are penalized for their
handicap with a lower quality spouse. This suggests that spousal smoking is a bad
characteristic for non-smokers, and that there is a marriage market penalty associated to
13Assuming that each extra year of education an individual gets is worth about an eight percent increment
to their annual earnings.
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it, in terms of lower socioeconomic standards. Finally, columns (3) and (4) show that among
non-smoking husbands those with non-smoking wives have on average 0.24 to 0.21 more years
of completed education than those with smoking wives. Thus, a non-smoking wife marries, on
average, a better non-smoker spouse in terms of education.
[Table 4 about here]
4.2.3 Smoking Premium and Smoking Penalty controlling for the Propensity
Score
Overall, the estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with our model, and support
hypotheses 2 and 3. A potential concern is that smoking status captures some characteristics
that we do not observe in our data (e.g., personality traits) that would explain the above
empirical ndings. Although smoking is correlated with self-control and impatience, recent
empirical evidence shows that some non-cognitive skills and personality traits exhibit negative
sorting in the marriage market, opposite to the strong positive sorting observed for smoking
status. Dupuy and Galichon (2014) and Lundberg (2012) nd that there is negative sorting in
autonomy, that male extraversion is negatively correlated with female conscientiousness and
risk attitudes, and male agreeableness is negatively correlated with female extraversion.14
Another concern is whether such empirical patterns (even when controlling for additional
covariates) are the mere reection of smoking behavior being endogenous to marital status,
rather than a conrmation of the postulated marriage market mechanism. We explore such
a possibility by using a simple and popular estimator in program evaluation (see Wooldridge,
2002) obtained from an OLS regression of education on spousal smoking status controlling
for the predicted probability that the spouse is a smoker (the propensity score). The spousal
propensity score is the probability that the spouse is a smoker given a set of observable
characteristics. To make this approach as appealing as possible (at least one of) the predictors
must be predetermined with respect to marital status, and the age at which the spouse started
smoking regularly seems a natural candidate. Hence, we predict the probability that the spouse
j is a smoker (Smokingj = 1) given a set of spousal characteristics (Xj) using a probability
14Lundberg (2012) also nds that extraversion and neuroticism only matter for women, while conscientious-
ness only for men, in terms of marriage probabilities.
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model (Probit):
Smokingj = (Xj) + "j (9)
where  is the standard normal cdf and Xj contains the following spousal characteristics:
age (in categories), years of education, year xed e¤ects, state xed e¤ects, and age at which
the spouse started smoking regularly. We code this last variable as 0 for never smokers or
never regular smokers. For this reason, and the fact that people who start regularly using
tobacco when they are younger are more likely to have trouble quitting than people who start
later in life (Surgeon Generals Report, 2012), we expect a non-linear relationship between
smoking status today and age at which the individual started smoking regularly, so that we
also consider the square of this variable as an additional predictor.
Once we have estimated the propensity scores \Smokingj for men and women (see Table
A1), we then estimate the following OLS regressions
Educationi = + Smokingj +  \Smokingj + ui (10)
for four groups of individuals, smoking wives, smoking husbands, non-smoking wives, and
non-smoking husbands, but also
Educationi = + Smokingj + 1 \Smokingj + 2 \Smoking
2
j + ui (11)
to account for potential nonlinearities of the conditional expectation function of education
in the propensity score. The estimated propensity score plays the role of a control function.
[Table 5 about here]
[Table 6 about here]
Reassuringly, the estimates displayed in Tables 5 and 6 give a similar picture to our main
estimates in Tables 3 and 4, and are indeed consistent with existing research. Using informa-
tion on engaged couples, newlyweds, and couples married for over 5 years, Sutton (1993) nds
that similarities in smoking status were already present about the time of marriage. More
recently, Banks, Kelly and Smith (2013), who use retrospective evidence from the Health
and Retirement Study, show that most smoking behavior is initiated before marriage, so that
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smoking is not endogenous to marital status. Controlling for own age in equations (10) and
(11) is immaterial for our ndings (results available upon request).
4.2.4 Assortativeness by SES among couples with identical smoking habits
In Table 7 we investigate the degree of assortativeness by education among di¤erent types
of couples depending on spouses smoking status. For each type of couple, we regress own
education on spouses education controlling for own age, year and state xed e¤ects. Our
estimates reveal positive assortative matching by education for each type of couple. Although
assortative mating by education has been extensively documented in the literature (Lam, 1988;
Pencavel, 1998; Qian, 1998; Mare, 2008), here we show that it holds true within each spouses
smoking category. This is consistent with hypothesis 4.
[Table 7 about here]
4.2.5 Stronger Assortativeness by Smoking Status at the Top of the SES distri-
bution
In Table 8 we investigate how the degree of assortativeness by smoking status varies across
the SES distribution. We run regressions of a spousal smoking status indicator on individual
smoking status, individual SES and the interaction of these two variables. We measure SES in
two di¤erent ways: years of schooling and high-school degree or above (12 years of schooling
or more). The results of these regressions suggest that, if anything, mixed couples (i.e.,
where one spouse is a smoker and the other is not) are less prevalent at high SES, supporting
hypothesis 5.
[Table 8 about here]
4.2.6 Conditional versus Unconditional Correlations between Smoking and SES
Finally, in Table 9 we run regressions of education on smoking status for two samples, non-
smoking women and smoking men, controlling or not for spousal SES. Our ndings support
hypothesis 6. Among men married to non-smoking women, smoking men tend to have (on
average) a lower SES (1.3 fewer years of education) but this di¤erence decreases (to 0.7 years
less of education) when controlling for their wivesSES. Among women married to smoking
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men, smoking women tend to have (on average) a lower SES (around 0.3 fewer years of
education) regardless of their husbandsSES.
[Table 9 about here]
4.3 Refutability Tests
We implement two types of refutability tests (see Angrist and Krueger, 2001). We rst provide
placebo tests based on the idea that the predictions of our model should not be borne out
in the data when married men and women are randomly assigned to couples. In our second
approach, we test the proportionality constraints implied by an alternative single-index model.
4.3.1 Placebo Tests
We reshu­ e our observed married individuals into new randomly married couples. The way
we do it is in two stages. We rst keep married men in our sample and generate a new id
drawn from a uniform distribution for each of these men, and then rank them according to
that pseudo-random id. We do the same for married women: we generate a new id drawn
from a uniform distribution for each of these women, and then rank them according to that
pseudo-random id. We then merge men and women according to that pseudo-random id. This
constitutes our random matching sample. After that, we investigate whether the hypotheses
based on the predictions of our model are observed in these randomly generated data. The
answer is clearly negative:
 Table S2 in the Supplementary Material shows that with randomly generated couples,
it is not true that among smoking husbands those who marry smoking wives have (on
average) a higher SES.
 Table S3 in the Supplementary Material shows that with randomly generated couples,
it is not true that among non-smoking wives, those who marry smoking husbands have
(on average) a lower SES.
 Table S4 in the Supplementary Material shows that with randomly generated couples,
it is not true that mixedcouples are less prevalent at high levels of SES.
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 Finally, Table S5 in the Supplementary Material reveals that with randomly generated
couples, hypothesis 6 is not borne out in the data.
All in all, it seems that our model cannot explain the marriage patterns of randomly
generated couples.
4.3.2 Alternative Single-Index Model
Our bidimensional model of smoking and SES rules out a single index representation: the
trade-o¤ between these two characteristics is perceived di¤erently among potential spouses,
which is precisely what index models forbid. Chiappori et al. (2012) have shown that index
models are testable; they must satisfy a set of proportionality restrictions. In Table S6 in the
Supplementary Material, we show that these predictions are rejected by the data when the
two dimensions are smoking status and SES, providing additional support for the contention
that, albeit very appealing, the single-index model representation is not always appropriate,
and that, in particular, it does not apply to our case.
5 Discussion
Our model parsimoniously assumes that the presence of a smoking spouse decreases surplus
by the same factor irrespective of the partners smoking status. This assumption could be
relaxed; one could assume, for instance, that the surplus discount is larger for mixed couples.
The corresponding, more general model would still be solvable using the same technique. Most
general conclusions would remain valid. In particular, there would be assortative matching
at the top of the distribution; if male smokers outnumbered female ones, then mixed couples
would consist of a male smoker and a non-smoking wife; and in the latter case the wife would
marry up. However, other predictions would be lost. For instance, the last statement of
Proposition 5 would no longer hold; when a smoking man randomizes between two potential
spouses, they will not have the same socioeconomic index (although, interestingly, they do in
the data, see Table 6). In addition, the closed-form solution of the uniform-quadratic example
provided in Supplementary Material would no longer be valid; its resolution, although still
feasible, would become more complex (and tedious). For instance, it would require considering
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more cases. All in all, the new, and less tractable, model, would lose in empirical content (al-
though the predictions that would be discarded are supported by the data), with no signicant
gain in terms of its basic insights. We therefore believe that parsimony considerations suggest
concentrating on the single  case.
6 Conclusions
We develop a bidimensional frictionless matching model on the marriage market under trans-
ferable utility, where individuals are characterized by a continuous trait (e.g., socioeconomic
status) and a binary attribute (e.g., smoking status) which is heterogeneously (dis)liked in the
population. As long as traits are not perfectly correlated, this heterogeneity is key: it rules
out a single-index representation. The trade-o¤ between the two characteristics is perceived
di¤erently among potential spouses, which is precisely what index models forbid. That is, the
corresponding one-dimensional matching techniques are not well-suited to characterize the
stable matches in this setting, and this paper precisely characterizes a specic extension to
allow for heterogeneous preferences.
The main message of our paper is twofold. First, specic multidimensional models of
matching, although intrinsically more complex than one-dimensional ones, are by no means
intractable. We actually describe a general strategy for tackling problems of this type, and
in particular how the characterization of the equilibrium can be formulated as an optimal
control problem; we also show how such a theoretical approach can generate strong predictions
on matching patterns. While we concentrate on smoking in our empirical application, other
aspects could readily be considered. Race or ethnicity are important examples (e.g., Chiappori,
Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque, 2016), or characteristics such as age or health attributes.
Secondly, while one-dimensional models are di¢ cult to test, at least in the absence of ad-
ditional information on either match-specic surpluses or transfers between agents, in more
complex settings, and particularly in multidimensional contexts, the strong qualitative predic-
tions that matching theory generates can be taken to the data. Hypotheses based on these
predictions can be tested in reduced form. In our case, the model predicts a series of specic
patterns (from the relative scarcity of couples where the wife smokes and the husband does
not, to the opposite association of a smoking spouse on ones education for wives and hus-
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bands) that are di¢ cult to justify otherwise, and can be directly tested in a simple and robust
way. We do not view such a strategy as a substitute for more explicitly structural approaches,
but we believe it provides an informative complement.
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A Proof of Proposition 3
Take some small " > 0 such that
S (1  "; 1  ") > S (1; 1)
Dene  (") > 0 by Z 1
1 "
dFN (s) =
Z 1
1 (")
dGN (s) : (12)
so that there are exactly as many non-smoking men with SES above 1   (") as non-smoking
women with SES above 1  ". We claim that almost all female non-smokers with SES at least
1   " are married with a male non-smoker with SES at least 1    (") (note that (12) then
implies that, conversely, almost all male non-smokers with SES at least 1   (") are married
with a female non-smoker with SES at least 1  "). Assume not, then there exists a positive
measure set O of female non-smokers with SES at least 1  " married with a smoker. By (12),
there must exist a set O0 of identical measure gathering male non-smokers with SES at least
1   ("), who are not married with female non-smokers with SES at least 1  ". Then either
almost all males in O0 are married with non-smokers with SES less than 1   ", or a non-null
subset of males in O0 is matched with smokers.
We start with the second case. Let x 2 O; y her (smoking) match, and y0 2 O0 matched
with a smoker x0. Surplus is
 = S (x; y) + S
 
x0; y0

while matching x and y0 would generate a surplus
1 = S
 
x; y0

+ S
 
x0; y

By denition of ", 1 > , a contradiction.
Assume now that almost all males in O0 are married with non-smokers with SES less than
1  ". Let x 2 O be matched with yS , smoker, while y0 2 O0 is matched with a non-smoking
wife x0 < 1  ". The surplus generated is thus
 = S
 
x0; y0

+ S (x; yS)
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whereas mixing matches would generate
1 = S
 
x; y0

+ S
 
x0; yS

Note that yS > 1   ("), for otherwise
1    = S
 
x; y0
  S  x0; y0    S (x; yS)  S  x0; yS
> S
 
x; y0
  S  x0; y0   S (x; yS)  S  x0; yS > 0
by supermodularity, which contradicts surplus maximization. Dene
 (s) = S (x; s)  S  x0; s
then  is di¤erentiable and strictly positive on [0; 1]. We have that
  y0   (yS)  y0   ySM
where M = sup[0;1] j0j, and where jy0   yS j   ("). It follows that
 (yS)  
 
y0

+  (")M
therefore
1    = 
 
y0
   (yS)  (1  )  y0   (")M
which is positive for " small enough, a contradiction.
B Proof of Proposition 4
The proof relies on the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 If an open set of non-smoking women are indi¤erent between marrying a smoker
and a non-smoker, and marry any with positive probability at a stable match, then the smoker
has a higher SES than the non-smoker. However, if a smoker is indi¤erent between marrying
a smoker and a non-smoker, and marries any with positive probability at a stable match, then
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the two potential spouses have the same SES.
Proof. Assume Ms. x marries either Mr. y (a non-smoker) or Mr. y0 (a smoker) at the
stable match; let u (x) denote her utility. Then by stability
u (x) = max
s
(S (x; s)  vN (s))
= max
s0
 
S
 
x; s0
  vS  s0
where vN (s) (resp. vS (s0)) is the utility of a non-smoker (smoker) with SES s (s0); note that
the max is reached for s = y and s0 = y0 respectively. By the envelope theorem:
u0 (x) =
@
@x
S (x; y) = 
@
@x
S
 
x; y0

Since @S=@x is strictly increasing in y,  < 1 requires y0 > y. The proof of the second claim
is similar.
We can now prove the proposition. By Lemma 1, y0 > y and x = x0. Assume that
qN (y) > 0, i.e., that y marries a smoker x00 with positive probability. Then x00 > x = x0 by
Lemma 1. But the couples (x00; y) and (x0; y0) generate a surplus
 = S
 
x00; y

+ S
 
x0; y0

while the mixed couples (x0; y) and (x00; y0) would generate a surplus
1 = S
 
x0; y

+ S
 
x00; y0

and 1 >  by supermodularity of S; an open set of marriages satisfying this pattern would
violate surplus maximization.
Similarly, assume that pS (x0) < 1, i.e., that x0 marries a non-smoker y with positive
probability. Then y = y0 > y by Lemma 1. The couples (x; y) and (x0; y) generate a surplus
 = S (x; y) + S
 
x0; y

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while the mixed couples (x; y) and (x0; y) would generate a surplus
1 = S (x; y) + S
 
x0; y

Since
S (x; y)  S (x; y) = S  x0; y  S  x0; y >   S  x0; y  S  x0; y
we have that 1 > ; again, an open set of marriages satisfying this pattern would violate
surplus maximization. The proof of the last statement is identical.
C Proof of Proposition 5
The rst statement is a direct consequence of Proposition 3. Similarly, the last two statements
directly follow from Lemma 1 above. To establish the second, we need to show that any
mixed marriage can only involve a non-smoking woman and a male smoker. Under the Male
Prevalence assumption, this directly follows from the proof of Proposition 4.
D Recovering individual utilities in the stable match
D.1 The symmetric case
Assume Ms. x (a non-smoker) marries Mr. y (also a non-smoker) at the stable match; note
that x = y by the previous Proposition. Let uN (x) (resp. vN (y)) denote her (his) utility.
Then
uN (x) + vN (x) = S (x; x)
By symmetry:
uN (x) =
S (x; x)
2
; vN (y) =
S (y; y)
2
and similarly
uS (x) = 
S (x; x)
2
; vS (y) = 
S (y; y)
2
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D.2 The general case
Consider for instance a non-smoker wife with SES x. If her husband is a non-smoker with
SES N (x), then stability implies that:
uN (x) = max
y
(S (x; y)  vN (y))
the maximum being reached for y =  (x). It follows, from the envelope theorem, that
u0N (x) =
@S
@x
where the right-hand side derivative is taken at the point (x; N (x)). Then:
uN (x) =
Z x
0
@
@x
S (t; N (t)) dt+K
where K is a constant; and a similar expression obtains for the other utilities. The various
utilities are therefore dened up to an additive constant each; the constants, in turn, are
pinned down by the adding up property on the support of  and the indi¤erence conditions.
In particular, it becomes possible to compute the di¤erence uN (x)  uS (x), which can be
interpreted as the cost of smoking on the marriage market   or equivalently as the gain that
would result from quitting   for a woman with SES x.
D.3 The constrained general case
We now compute individual utilities at the stable matching, as a function of SES, gender and
smoking habit. Specically:
Proposition 6 Under the MP assumption, individual utilities uN (x) ; uS (x) ; vN (y) ; vS (y)
are all increasing. For all x and all y,
uN (x)  uS (x) and vN (y)  vS (y)
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Moreover, whenever pN (x) > 0, then
uN (x) = uS (x)
Lastly, for x and y large enough, the di¤erences uN (x)   uS (x) and vN (y)   vS (y) are
increasing (in x and y respectively).
Proof. Assume Ms. x marries either Mr. y (a non-smoker) or Mr. y0The rst inequality
comes from the fact that, for any given SES, a non-smoker can only be either an equivalent or
a better partner than a smoker. Next, if pN (x) > 0, both a smoking and a non-smoking wives
marry the same smoking husband with positive probability. Since the total surplus is the same
in both cases, their utility must be the same. Lastly, rst order conditions give that
u0N (x) =
@
@x
S (x; N (x)) > 0
u0S (x) = 
@
@x
S (x;  S (x)) > 0
so that
(uN (x)  uS (x))0 = @
@x
S (x; N (x))   @
@x
S (x;  S (x))
For x large enough, both N (x) and  S (x) are close to 1, and that di¤erence is positive.
In short, utility increases with the persons SES, and smokers are never better o¤ than non-
smokers. However, whenever randomization takes place, a womans welfare does not depend
on her smoking status: both smokers and non-smokers marry a smoking husband with positive
probability, with whom they generate the same surplus. For men, on the other hand, welfare
is always smaller for smokers. Finally, at the top of the SES distribution, the cost of being
a smoker increases with social status. In the uniform-quadratic example we present in the
Supplementary Material, things are even simpler: the cost, for a woman, of being a smoker
(as measured by the di¤erence uN (x) uS (x)) is zero below the randomization threshold and
increases with SES above it; for men, it is always positive and always increasing.
38
References
[1] Angrist, J., Krueger, A. (1999) Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics,in Handbook
of Labor Economics, O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (Eds.), Elsevier, Volume 3A.
[2] ASH (2011) Secondhand Smoke,Research Report.
[3] Banerjee, A., Duo, E., Ghatak, M., Lafortune, J. (2013) Marry for What? Caste and
Mate Selection in Modern India,American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2):
3372.
[4] Banks, J., Kelly, E., Smith J.P. (2013) Spousal health e¤ects: the role of selection, in
Discoveries in the Economics of Aging, D.A. Wise (ed)., NBER Book Series, University
of Chicago Press.
[5] Becker, G. (1973) A Theory of Marriage: Part I, Journal of Political Economy,
81(4):813846.
[6] Becker, G. (1991) A treatise on the family, Harvard University Press.
[7] Caraballo, R.S., Giovino, G.A., Pechacek, T.F., Mowery, P.D. (2001) Factors associ-
ated with discrepancies between self-reports on cigarette smoking and measured serum
cotinine levels among person aged 17 years or older: third national health and nutrition
examination survey, 1988-1994,American Journal of Epidemiology, 153(8):807814.
[8] CDC (2006) The health consequences of involuntary exposure
to tobacco smoke: A report of the Surgeon General, Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing O¢ ce; 2006. Available from:
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2006/index.htm
[9] CDC (2010) Vital Signs: Current Cigarette Smoking Among
Adults Aged 18 Years  United States, 2009, Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report, CDC, 59(35):11351140. Available from:
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5935a3.htm?s_cid=mm5935a3_w
[10] Chiappori, P.-A., Iyigun, M., Weiss, Y. (2009) Investment in Schooling and the Marriage
Market,American Economic Review, 99(5):16891713.
39
[11] Chiappori, P.-A., McCann, R., Nesheim, L. (2010) Hedonic price equilibria, stable
matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness,Economic The-
ory, 42(2):317354.
[12] Chiappori, P.-A., Ore¢ ce, S., Quintana-Domeque, C. (2012) Fatter attraction: anthro-
pometric and socioeconomic matching on the marriage market,Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 120(4):659695.
[13] Chiappori, P.-A., Ore¢ ce, S., Quintana-Domeque, C. (2016) Black-White Marital
Matching: Race, Anthropometrics, and Socioeconomics, Journal of Demographic Eco-
nomics, forthcoming.
[14] Chiappori, P.-A., Salanié, B. (2015) The Econometrics of Matching Models, Journal of
Economic Literature, forthcoming.
[15] Chiappori, P.-A., Salanié, B., Weiss, Y. (2014) Partner Choice and the Marital College
Premium,mimeo, Columbia University.
[16] Choo, E., Siow, A. (2006) Who marries whom and why,Journal of Political Economy,
114(1):172201.
[17] Clark, A., Etilé, F. (2006) Dont give up on me baby: spousal correlation in smoking
behaviour,Journal of Health Economics, 25(5):958978.
[18] Coles, M., Francesconi, M. (2013) Equilibrium Search and the Impact of Equal Oppor-
tunities for Women,Economics Discussion Papers 742, University of Essex, Department
of Economics.
[19] Delnevo, C.D., Bauer, U.E. (2009) Monitoring the tobacco use epidemic III: The host:
data sources and methodological challenges,Preventive Medicine, 48(1):S16-S23.
[20] Dupuy, A., Galichon, A. (2014) Personality traits and the marriage market,Journal of
Political Economy, 122(6):12711319.
[21] Ekeland, I. (2010) Existence, uniqueness and e¢ ciency of equilibrium in hedonic markets
with multidimensional types,Economic Theory, 42(2):275315.
40
[22] Fox, J. (2010) Identication in matching games,Quantitative Economics, 1(2):203254.
[23] Galichon, A., Salanié, B. (2010) Cupids Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identica-
tion in Matching Models, Columbia University, Discussion Paper: 0910-14.
[24] Glymour, M., DeFries, T., Kawachi, I., Avendano, M. (2008) Spousal Smoking and Inci-
dence of First Stroke The Health and Retirement Study,American Journal of Preventive
Medicine, 35(3):245248.
[25] Graham, B. (2011) Econometric Methods for the Analysis of Assignment Problems in
the Presence of Complementarity and Social Spillovers,in J. Benhabib, M. Jackson and
A. Bisin eds: Handbook of Social Economics, North-Holland, Vol. 1B, 965-1052.
[26] Gretsky, N., Ostroy, J., Zame, W. (1992) The nonatomic assignment model,Economic
Theory 2, 103-27.
[27] Gretsky, N., Ostroy, J., Zame, W. (1999) Perfect competition in the continuous assign-
ment model,Journal of Economic Theory, 88(1):60118.
[28] Gruber, J. (2001) Tobacco at the crossroads: the past and future of smoking regulation
in the United States,Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2):193212.
[29] Hitsch, G., Hortaçsu, A., Ariely, D. (2010) Matching and Sorting in Online Dating,
American Economic Review, 100(1):130163.
[30] Kantorovich, L. (1942) On the translocation of masses,Dokl. Akad. Nauk SSSR, 37(7
8):227229.
[31] Koopmans, T.C., Beckmann, M. (1957) Assignment problems and the location of eco-
nomic activities,Econometrica, 25(1):5376.
[32] Lader, D. (2009) Smoking-related behaviour and attitudes, 2008/09.Opinions survey
report 40.
[33] Lam, D. (1988) Marriage Markets and Assortative Mating with Household Public Goods:
Theoretical results and empirical implications,Journal of Human Resources, 23(4):462
487.
41
[34] Lundberg, S. (2012) Personality and marital surplus,IZA Journal of Labor Economics,
1:3.
[35] Madrian, B., Lefgren, L. (1999) A note on longitudinally matching CPS respondents,
NBER Technical Working Paper #247.
[36] Mannino, D., Siegel, M., Rose, D., Nkuchia, J., Etzel, R. (1997) Environmental tobacco
smoke exposure in the home and worksite and health e¤ects in adults: results from the
1991 national health interview survey,Tobacco Control, 6(4):296305.
[37] Maralani, V. (2009) An Unequal Start: The Alignment of Education and Smoking in
Families of Origin,mimeo, Yale University.
[38] Mare, R. (2008) Educational Assortative Mating in Two Generations,mimeo, Univer-
sity of California at Los Angeles.
[39] McCann, R., Guillen, N. (2010) Five lectures on optimal transportation: geometry,
regularity and applications,University of Toronto.
[40] Mills, A., Messer, K., Gilpin, L., Pierce, G. (2009) The e¤ect of smoke-free homes on
adult smoking behavior: a review,Nicotine Tobacco Research, 11(10):11311141.
[41] Monge, G. (1781) Mémoire sur la théorie des déblais et de remblais, Histoire de
lAcadémie Royale des Sciences de Paris, avec les Mémoires de Mathématique et de
Physique pour la même année, 666704.
[42] NCHS (2010) National Center for Health Statistics. Health, United States, 2009: With
Special Feature on Medical Technology. Hyattsville, MD. 2010.
[43] Öberg, M., Jaakkola, M., Woodward, A., Peruga, A., Prüss-Ustün, A. (2011) Worldwide
burden of disease from exposure to second-hand smoke: a retrospective analysis of data
from 192 countries,Lancet ; 377(9760):139146.
[44] Ore¢ ce, S., Quintana-Domeque, C. (2010) Anthropometry and socioeconomics among
couples: Evidence in the United States,Economics and Human Biology, 8(3):373384.
[45] Pencavel, J. (1998) Assortative Mating by Schooling and the Work Behavior of Wives
and Husbands,American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 88(2):326329.
42
[46] Pilkington, P., Gray, S., Gilmore, A., Daykin, N. (2006) Attitudes towards second hand
smoke amongst a highly exposed workforce: survey of London casino workers,Journal
of Public Health, 28(2):104110.
[47] Qian, Z. (1998) Changes in Assortative Mating: The Impact of Age and Education,
19701990Demography, 35(3):279292.
[48] Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M. (1971) The Assignment Game I: The Core, International
Journal of Game Theory, 1(1):111130.
[49] Shimer, R., Smith, L. (2000) Assortative matching and search, Econometrica,
68(2):343369.
[50] Silventoinen, K., Kaprio, J., Lahelma, E., Viken, R.J., Rose, R.J. (2003) Assortative
mating by body height and BMI; Finnish twins and their spouses,American Journal of
Human Biology, 15(5):620627.
[51] Surgeon Generals Report (2001) Women and Smoking: a report from the Surgeon
General,US Department of Health and Human Services.
[52] Surgeon Generals Report (2012) Preventing Tobacco Use Among Youth and Young
Adults, US Department of Health and Human Services.
[53] Sutton, G. (1980) Assortative marriage for smoking habits,Annals of Human Biology,
7(5):449456.
[54] Sutton, G. (1993) Do men grow to resemble their wives or vice versa?, Journal of
Biological Science, 25(1):2529.
[55] Venters, M., Jacobs, D., Luepker, R., Maimaw, L., Gillum, R. (1984) Spouse concordance
of smoking patterns: the Minnesota heart survey,American Journal of Epidemiology,
120(4):608616.
[56] Villani, C. (2003) Topics in Optimal Transportation,Volume 58 of Graduate Studies
in Mathematics. American Mathematical Society, Providence.
[57] Weiss, Y., Willis, R. (1997) Match quality, new information, and marital dissolution,
Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1):293329.
43
[58] Wooldridge, J. (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press.
44
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Means (Standard Deviations)
A. Married Husbands Wives
Age (years) 29.48 27.81
(2.80) (2.78)
Education (years) 13.65 13.79
(2.37) (2.30)
Smoke (= 1 if every day / some day smoker and 100 cigarettes in their lifetime) 0.22 0.17
(0.42) (0.38)
Very Healthy (= 1 if excellent or very good self-reported health) 0.83 0.80
(0.38) (0.40)
Number of children under age 6 0.83
(0.85)
Number of couples 10,305
B. Never Married Men Women
Age (years) 28.24 25.91
(3.12) (3.06)
Education (years) 13.77 13.99
(2.28) (2.22)
Smoke (= 1 if every day / some day smoker and 100 cigarettes in their lifetime) 0.29 0.26
(0.45) (0.44)
Very Healthy (= 1 if excellent or very good self-reported health) 0.79 0.77
(0.41) (0.42)
Number of children under age 6 0.04 0.15
(0.24) (0.44)
Number of individuals 8,990 9,361
Note. CPS 1996-2003, Men aged 24-34, Women aged 22-32. Sampling weights are used.
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Table 2: Matching Patterns by Smoking Status
A. Observed Non-Smoking Wife Smoking Wife
Non-Smoking Husband 70.93% 6.70%
(7,390) (683)
Smoking Husband 11.93% 10.44%
(1,211) (1,021)
B. Random Non-Smoking Wife Smoking Wife
Non-Smoking Husband 64.32% 13.30%
Smoking Husband 18.53% 3.83%
C. Prevalence Ratios of Mixed Couples Observed Random
Ratios 6.7011.93 = 0.56
13.30
18.53 = 0.72
[0.03] [0.02]
D. Prevalence Ratios of Mixed Couples by Census Division Observed Random
Ratios in Census Division 1 (New England) 0.57 0.72
[0.12] [0.08]
Ratios in Census Division 2 (Middle Atlantic) 0.63 0.73
[0.09] [0.07]
Ratios in Census Division 3 (East North Central) 0.67 0.80
[0.09] [0.06]
Ratios in Census Division 4 (West North Central) 0.62 0.75
[0.11] [0.08]
Ratios in Census Division 5 (South Atlantic) 0.43 0.63
[0.07] [0.05]
Ratios in Census Division 6 (East South Central) 0.58 0.75
[0.12] [0.08]
Ratios in Census Division 7 (West South Central) 0.48 0.67
[0.08] [0.06]
Ratios in Census Division 8 (Mountain) 0.55 0.70
[0.09] [0.07]
Ratios in Census Division 9 (Pacific) 0.56 0.69
[0.10] [0.08]
Note. Sampling weights are used. Weighted % and (non-weighted number of observations).
“Delta method” standard errors in brackets.
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Table 3:
Regressions of Education on Spousal Smoking Status for Smokers
Sample
Smoking Wives Smoking Husbands
Dependent variable: Wife’s Education Husband’s Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse is a Smoker −0.002 −0.006 0.139* 0.151*
(0.092) (0.092) (0.080) (0.080)
Spouse’s Education 0.471*** 0.461*** 0.555*** 0.542***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 1,704 1,704 2,232 2,232
R2 0.28 0.29 0.37 0.37
Note. Standard controls: own age, year and state fixed effects.
Additional controls: spousal very healthy indicator, number of children
under age 6 and a male-head indicator.
Sampling weights are used.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
47
Table 4:
Regressions of Education on Spousal Smoking Status for Non-Smokers
Sample
Non-Smoking Wives Non-Smoking Husbands
Dependent variable: Wife’s Education Husband’s Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse is a Smoker −0.133** −0.108* −0.235*** −0.208***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.080) (0.080)
Spouse’s Education 0.636*** 0.608*** 0.684*** 0.669***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 8,601 8,601 8,073 8,073
R2 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.47
Note. Standard controls: own age, year and state fixed effects.
Additional controls: spousal very healthy indicator, number of children
under age 6 and a male-head indicator.
Sampling weights are used.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 5:
Regressions of Education on Spousal Smoking Status for Smokers
Controlling for Spousal Propensity to Smoke P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics)
Sample
Smoking Wives Smoking Husbands
Dependent variable: Wife’s Education Husband’s Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse is a Smoker −0.009 −0.004 0.250* 0.238*
(0.151) (0.165) (0.130) (0.138)
P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics) −0.568** 2.93*** −0.743*** 3.12***
(0.245) (0.816) (0.207) (0.704)
P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics)2 — −5.10*** — −5.77***
(0.999) (0.895)
N 1,656 1,656 2,204 2,204
R2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03
Note. P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics) is the predicted probability of a spouse smoking
status using a Probit.
Spouse′s characteristics: age (in categories), years of education,
age when he/she started smoking, and its square (in columns (2) and (4)), year and
state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
49
Table 6:
Regressions of Education on Spousal Smoking Status for Non-Smokers
Controlling for Spousal Propensity to Smoke P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics)
Sample
Non-Smoking Wives Non-Smoking Husbands
Dependent variable: Wife’s Education Husband’s Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse is a Smoker −0.230** −0.236** −0.450*** −0.435***
(0.101) (0.096) (0.112) (0.111)
P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics) −1.42*** 2.57*** −1.02*** 0.654
(0.132) (0.588) (0.145) (0.540)
P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics)2 — −5.87*** — −2.63***
(0.893) (0.834)
N 8,529 8,529 8,038 8,038
R2 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
Note. P̂ (Spouse′s characteristics) is the predicted probability of a spouse smoking
status using a Probit.
Spouse′s characteristics: age (in categories), years of education,
age when he/she started smoking, and its square (in columns (2) and (4)), year and
state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 7: Assortative Matching by Education
Regressions of Education on Spousal Education by Type of Couple
Both Non-Smokers Both Smokers
Wife’s Husband’s Wife’s Husband’s
Education Education Education Education
Spouse’s Education 0.641*** 0.695*** 0.464*** 0.440***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.037) (0.035)
N 7,390 7,390 1,021 1,021
R2 0.47 0.47 0.27 0.28
Smoking Husband Non-Smoking Husband
Non-Smoking Wife Smoking Wife
Wife’s Husband’s Wife’s Husband’s
Education Education Education Education
Spouse’s Education 0.604*** 0.619*** 0.482*** 0.488***
(0.034) (0.040) (0.047) (0.044)
N 1,211 1,211 683 683
R2 0.44 0.44 0.33 0.31
Note. All regressions include own age, year and state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 8: Assortativeness in Smoking Status by SES
Regressions of Spousal Smoking Status
Wife is a Smoker Husband is a Smoker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education −0.014*** — −0.022*** —
(0.001) (0.002)
Smoker 0.239*** 0.311*** 0.389*** 0.374***
(0.074) (0.032) (0.103) (0.045)
Education × Smoker 0.009 — 0.004 —
(0.006) (0.008)
High School (or more) — −0.034** — −0.105***
(0.016) (0.020)
High School (or more) × Smoker — 0.073** — 0.092*
(0.035) (0.047)
N 10,305 10,305 10,305 10,305
R2 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19
Note. All regressions include spouse’s age, year and state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table 9: Conditional and Unconditional Correlations
Regressions of Education on Smoking Status
Sample
Non-Smoking Women Smoking Men
Dependent variable: Husband’s Education Wife’s Education
Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional
Smoker −1.34*** −0.657*** −0.339*** −0.314***
(0.072) (0.055) (0.087) (0.073)
Spouse’s Education — 0.683*** — 0.559***
(0.008) (0.018)
Adjusted Wald Test
Test of Equality (p-value) 0.0000 0.6291
N 8,601 8,601 2,232 2,232
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.48 0.08 0.36
Note. All regressions include own age, year and state fixed effects.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Table A1: Propensity to Smoke
Probit Models of Smoking Status on Explanatory Variables
Wives Husbands
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age individual started smoking regularly 0.145*** 0.272*** 0.157*** 0.290***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.013)
Age individual started smoking regularly2 — −0.006*** — −0.007***
(0.0004) (0.0006)
Education −0.124*** −0.106*** −0.141*** −0.131***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Age fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
State fixed effects YES YES YES YES
N 10,835 10,835 10,790 10,790
Pseudo-R2 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.55
Note. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1
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Figure 1: Number of Smokers by Educational Level and Gender. Married.
55
